The Vulnerable Society

This article is on a topic I have touched on before in this blog – the vulnerability of our infrastructure. The purpose of the article is twofold: to gather in one place my various thoughts on infrastructure vulnerability, and to issue a call for action to reduce this vulnerability before our infrastructure is compromised and we have to pay an unacceptably high price. This concern is valid for the U.S. and for other countries highly dependent on infrastructure.

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The Vulnerabile Society

This article is a call for action on an issue that has important implications for the U.S. – the fact that infrastructure on which we are highly dependent can be compromised by deliberate action by our enemies. I am not raising a new concern, but one that, despite some attention in recent years, is still not receiving the level of attention from public officials and the private sector that I believe it desperately needs. Failure to adequately address this issue can have dire consequences for our nation, and for other nations that find themselves in similar. situations.

I have written about this issue in bits and pieces before, starting in 2013, and continually return to the subject because I see too little happening to address a serious and growing problem. That problem is the vulnerability to cyber attacks on our infrastructure, a problem that genuinely scares me. This piece will pull my thoughts together in one place and review my concerns, which are now shared by a growing number of people as more and more cyber attacks occur and their harmful impacts are identified. I will also point out out the ways in which I believe this vulnerability can be mitigated, although complete elimination of cyber threats is not realistic. However, it is my strong belief that we can and must do a lot better at reducing these risks than we are now doing. The price for not doing better is potentially very high.
Infrastructure has been defined as “basic physical and organizational structures needed for the operation of a society or enterprise, or the services and facilities necessary for an economy to function.” The term is often used for the physical structures that support a society, such as roads, bridges, water supply, sewers, electrical grids, and telecommunications facilities.
A major concern is that most of our electricity supply today comes from large, centralized power plants that are poorly protected from attack, if at all, and most electrical power is distributed over above-ground power lines that form a highly interconnected grid subject to falling trees, storm damage, or sabotage. It wouldn’t take much to disable a portion of that grid and remove power from large numbers of utility customers. This concern is exacerbated by increasing computer control of the grid and its vulnerability to malevolent hacking. Given today’s level of protection against such hacking I am very worried.
It is important to emphasize that it is not electricity per se that is the valuable commodity but the services that access to electricity makes possible – lighting, heating, cooling, water services, manufacturing, transportation, and communications. Energy has always been critical to human activities, but what differentiates modern societies is the energy beyond human and animal power required to provide increasingly high levels of services. In the developed world we are totally dependent on these services and it is in society’s interest to provide these services in the most reliable way with the least amount of energy, to minimize costs and environmental and national security impacts. My growing concern is, that with steadily increasing electrification, including the electrification of transportation, and growing dependence on computer control and internet interconnection, that those many aspects of society that are dependent on electricity are increasingly vulnerable to serious disruption and blackmail. It is minimizing the risks associated with this vulnerability that must become a high priority focus of modern nations.
Another vulnerability, in addition to risks arising from cyber attacks, sabotage and military attacks, and one that has received some attention of late, is the impact that an electromagnetic pulse arising from a solar flare could have on our power systems. Interconnected power lines can act as a giant antenna that captures this electromagnetic energy and overloads the system and burns out power lines, transformers, and other equipment. This occurred in the 1860’s and burned out many telegraph lines. While physical components can be replaced it takes time, during which most people will be without power unless they have a backup generator. This is especially true for replacing the large power transformers in the system that are quite expensive and not routinely inventoried.
Still another area of concern is disruptions to the U.S. water supply, which have implications for public health, food production, and other public services. It is well known that after natural disasters one of the first infrastructure failures is that of the clean water distribution system. My growing concern is that we are not doing enough to make sure nobody is compromising or poisoning that water supply, which is largely unprotected. After 911 this topic began to get some increased attention from U.S. government agencies.
Another area of concern is telecommunications. Many of our communication systems today – telephone, television, Internet, GPS, weather forecasting, tele-education and tele-medicine – are dependent on solar-powered satellite links and any disruption of these links, whether inadvertent or deliberate, can disable critical elements of our society. These links provide unique and invaluable services, but the satellites are vulnerable to collisions with micrometeorites, disruption by solar flare radiation, sabotage and acts of war, and simply wearing out. And the number of links is increasing steadily as more and more satellites are placed into orbit.
It is well known that many public and private telecom networks are under regular cyber attack, by government-supported and private individuals. Many examples can be found, including the Stuxnet attack on Iranian centrifuges, the North Korean attack on SONY, recent ransomeware attacks, and the Russian attacks on U.S. and other national elections. The point is that we and others are highly vulnerable to cyber attacks, and unless we take steps to adequately protect our web-connected systems from these interventions I fear we will pay a terrible price. Too many of our public systems are now remotely controlled by wireless networks, and someone bent on doing damage and who is expert in hacking can make us hostage if our systems are penetrated. My concern is less with SONY than with our centralized electric utility systems that power our homes, businesses, hospitals, water supply systems, and many other aspects of modern life.
Is it difficult to provide this cyber protection? The simple answer is yes, for several reasons: the growing numbers of wireless networks and cyber hackers, the cost of counteracting malicious hacking, the availability of trained professionals to address the hacking issue, and what I have long considered a major problem – the inability to focus enough attention on cyber security issues.
Let me discuss each of these barriers in turn. Wireless networking is growing because it offers many advantages – reduced wiring requirements and related costs, remote operation and reduced manpower requirements, ability to monitor more variables continuously and control systems to a finer degree. Disadvantages arise when inadequate attention is paid to preventing hacker penetration into the network, thus allowing disruption of normal operations or allowing hackers to take control of the network. Also, the number of capable hackers is increasing rapidly. Many schemes have been proposed for restricting unauthorized access to a network, usually using passwords, but often these passwords are not adequate to stop an experienced hacker and most people are resistant to remembering long, complicated passwords. Many companies are also not yet convinced of the need to spend the money on sophisticated protection systems, and some may see the consequences of a hacking as less costly than the required investment.
Costs are inherent in any attempt to prevent hacking, ranging from software and hardware costs to labor costs. There is some indication that SONY, an electronics company, spent too little on protection costs by underestimating the potential threat to its cyber systems. It surely is a mistake it won’t make again, and the SONY experience, and others, should serve as wake up calls to other corporate and government bodies as well as individual consumers.
The trained manpower issue is a critical one. As has been noted in Congressional testimony, the vast majority of people available today to address cyber security issues are the ones who designed and implemented the current vulnerable information technology system. Should they be the ones to try and fix it, or do we need newly-trained cyber experts who are not so closely linked to today’s operating modes? Clearly there are people who have the requisite high level skills – think NSA – but are they available broadly on a global basis? Expertise in cyber security is already in high demand and will be in even greater demand in the future as more and more functions are digitized and the Internet-of-All-Things becomes a part of everyday life.
Finally, let me address the issue of focusing attention on cyber security issues. It has not been easy. I have personally observed resistance to addressing cyber security issues by the U.S. military and private electric utilities, largely due to lack of familiarity with required capabilities and associated costs. Fortunately, this is beginning to change now that the consequences of not being vigilant are becoming obvious.
Let me now tie all these concerns to our electric unity system. Today, and for most of the past century, it has been a highly centralized grid system where large central power plants distributed electricity radially via high voltage transmission lines and lower voltage local distribution lines. It was a ‘dumb’ system with little overall control and when one part of the grid went down lots of people lost their electricity supply until the grid problem could be fixed. Today we are developing a ‘smart’ grid with lots of electronic controls that allow isolation of problem areas to minimize the number of people affected, that facilitates transfer of power from one grid region to another, and that allows utilities access to consumer homes and businesses for better balancing of supply and demand. These ‘smart grid’ features offer many advantages to suppliers and consumers, ranging from improved energy security to reduced costs. The downside is that electronic networks controlling these various features of the smart grid can be penetrated by sophisticated hackers, and my impression is that until fairly recently utility executives were not paying sufficient attention to cyber security issues. We can hope that this is no longer the case, but we all know of utilities that have underinvested in protecting their systems – e.g., by not trimming back trees that could fall on and disrupt power lines during storms, and not putting more of their power lines underground.
The good news is that some federal and state government and quasi-governmental agencies are beginning to take the issue seriously. Reports are now available that address Black Sky Day possibilities, which are defined as “extraordinary and hazardous catastrophes utterly unlike the blue sky days during which utilities usually operate.”
An important example of this increased government attention was the release in January 2017 of the second installment of the Department of Energy’s Quadrennial Energy Review. These reports, started in 2013, survey the U.S. energy system. The first installment dealt broadly with the entirety of the nation’s energy infrastructure, which goes far beyond electricity to encompass natural gas and oil pipelines, storage infrastructure, and other facets. This one focused on electricity, the nation’s rapidly changing electrical grid, and the need for new action to protect against evolving cyber security threats.
The document noted the sprawling scale of U.S. electric infrastructure – 7,700 power plants, 55,800 substations, 707,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines, and 6.5 million additional miles of local lines spread out from the substations. It pointed out that dramatic change is sweeping over the sector and that this “rapidly evolving system” is in major need of modernization and upgrades to keep pace
“There’s the weak-link issue for the whole system,” Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz said in an interview when the report was released. “The reality is, for a lot of rural, smaller utilities, it’s a very difficult job to have the kind of expertise that will be needed in terms of cyber, so we suggest for example, grant programs to help with training, to help with analytical capacity in these situations.” “The economy would just take an enormous hit” from a successful grid attack, he said. The report also pointed out that cyberthreats are not the only challenge facing the grid. It warned that extreme weather events triggered by human-caused climate change also makes the system vulnerable.
The bottom line is that the integrity and reliability of many important infrastructure systems are at risk and a national commitment to minimizing these risks is a critical need. The primary responsibility of elected officials is to protect the U.S. public, and indications to date are that not enough is yet being done to meet that responsibility with respect to cyber threats. Red lights are flashing but is this to be another example of where the U.S. response is laggard until a crisis erupts? The sooner we address the following issues, via public education, legislation, and public and private practice, the more secure our energy and energy-dependent systems will be:
– identifying protection against cyber attacks as a national priority by both the President and the Congress.
– enhanced education of the public about the threat and implications of cyber attacks.
– engaging the government and private sector in a joint effort to develop new barriers to cyber network penetration that take into account both privacy concerns and the needs of the intelligence community to identify and protect us against internal and external threats.
– the need to focus greater attention on training of an increased number of cyber technology experts, much as we did in the aftermath of Sputnik in the late 1950s when the need for more trained scientists became evident.
– acceleration of the trend to distributed power generation, to reduce the risks of outages on today’s highly interconnected grid system that can lead to widespread loss of power. Distributed generation, in a smart grid system, can isolate (‘island’) local sources of lost power and keep the rest of the connected grid functioning. Renewable generation sources are inherently distributive and fit well into this category.

Of course the issue of global warming and climate change must also be addressed for reasons that go beyond reducing vulnerability of our power grid to extreme weather events. However, that is a topic that is receiving extensive attention elsewhere and one I will not discuss in this article.

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Cyber Security: Revisiting a Critical Issue

Three previous blog posts have mentioned or addressed in detail this critical issue which I believe represents a major vulnerability of U.S. electrical power and other industrial systems:
– ‘Grids, Smart Grids and More Grids: What’s Coming’,
July 7, 2014
– ‘The Vulnerability of Our Electric Utility System to
Cyber Attacks’, January 28, 2015
– ‘Returning to an Important Subject: The Vulnerability of
the U.S. Electrical Grid’, August 31, 2015

I mention this history because today (January 6, 2017) the Washington Post published the following article on the same subject, reporting on the results of the Quadrennial Energy Review just published by the U.S. Department of Energy. It focuses much needed attention on this growing vulnerability.

New Obama report warns of changing ‘threat environment’ for the electricity grid
By Chris Mooney

At a time of heightened focus on U.S. cybersecurity risks, the Energy Department released a comprehensive report on the nation’s rapidly changing electrical grid Friday that calls for new action to protect against evolving threats.

The agency urged policymakers to grant regulators new emergency powers should threats become imminent, among other recommendations.

The document notes the sprawling scale of U.S. electric infrastructure: The nation has 7,700 power plants (ranging from coal-fired to nuclear) and 55,800 substations. Some 707,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines link the two, and then 6.5 million additional miles of local lines spread out from the substations.

Dramatic change is sweeping over the sector. For instance, so-called smart meters are being added to bring more online control to the electrical grid. And more and more households are adding solar systems to their rooftops, providing new connecting points. A “rapidly evolving system” is in major need of modernization and upgrades to keep pace, the report says.

“There’s the weak-link issue for the whole system,” Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz said in an interview to highlight the report. “The reality is, for a lot of rural, smaller utilities, it’s a very difficult job to have the kind of expertise that will be needed in terms of cyber, so we suggest for example, grant programs to help with training, to help with analytical capacity in these situations.”

“The economy would just take an enormous hit” from a successful grid attack, he said.

The document is the second installment of the Quadrennial Energy Review, a series of wide-ranging reports surveying the entire U.S. energy system that the department began after President Obama announced new climate change policies in 2013. The first installment dealt broadly with the entirety of the nation’s energy infrastructure, which goes far beyond electricity to encompass natural gas and oil pipelines, storage infrastructure, and other facets. This one zooms in on electricity.

It highlights not only cyberattacks on electric infrastructure in Ukraine in late December of 2015 — in which three Ukrainian utilities were hit by synchronized cyberattacks, leading to power losses for 225,000 customers — but also the Oct. 21, 2016, event that used in-home Internet-connected devices, collectively, to lead a large denial-of-service attack.

“We know that this is not just a theoretical concern,” Moniz said.

The report calls for utilities to take engage in “deliberate risk management activities” as the electric power sector becomes increasingly interconnected with global communications networks.

“The threat environment is also changing — decision makers must make the case for investments that mitigate catastrophic, high-impact, low-probability events,” the report notes.

Cyberthreats are not the only challenge facing the grid. The report warns that extreme weather events triggered by human-caused climate change also makes the system vulnerable.

On grid security, the report contains myriad recommendations, including amending the Federal Power Act to give the Energy Department the ability to issue a “grid-security emergency order,” and also giving the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission new powers to bolster reliability standards that affect electricity-sector operators “if it finds that expeditious action is needed to protect national security in the face of fast-developing new threats to the grid.”

In the interview, Moniz said he hoped that under the next administration, the Quadrennial Energy Review process would continue, noting that the last installment of the report has already triggered major action. Of its 63 recommendations, the DOE has found, 21 are already “fully or partially reflected in Federal law.”

“We think that the second volume hopefully is going to have the same kind of track record,” Moniz said. “That’s the basis upon which I certainly hope, and will certainly recommend, presumably to [Energy secretary nominee Rick Perry], that the new administration take ownership of this, and keep it going.”

The DOE press release announcing the report can be found at
https://energy/gov/articles/administration-releases-second-installment-quadrennial-energy-review and the full report with related analyses can be found at energy.gov/QER.

Returning to an Important Subject: the Vulnerability of the U.S. Electrical Grid

I’ve just had an amazing experience – I listened for about an hour to an online advertisement for an investment newsletter. You may reasonably ask why would any compos mentis individual devote an hour of their life to an advertisement for a service that he was unlikely to sign up for? My answer is simple – the ad addresses an important issue that I have touched upon in earlier blog posts, and in accurate terms once you sift the wheat from the chaff of a much too long presentation. It also presents a worst case scenario to get your attention, a common advertising technique, but it also presents information on what I consider a significant national security risk – the vulnerability of our national electrical grid system to natural or malevolent events. The ad, in its infuriating stretched-out discussion, addresses this vulnerability from four sources – sabotage, solar flares, cyber attacks, and military attacks. The ad’s discussion includes references to federal government and NARUC (National Aassociation of Regulatory Utility Commissioners) reports that address Black Sky Day possibilities and which are easily accessed. Black Sky Days are defined as “extraordinary and hazardous catastrophes utterly unlike the blue sky days during which utilities usually operate.”

My concern about the grid vulnerability issue goes back about thirty years and has only grown with time. I truly believe we are a highly vulnerable society and are not yet paying enough attention to our vulnerabilities. I hope I am wrong.

In any event, I present the link to the ad below (I wish it had an Executive Summary) and to my two previous blog posts that discuss the vulnerability issue. We need more attention to these perhaps unlikely events but ones with potentially massive consequences.

1. The Black Sky Days Event Is “Imminent” – The Oxford Club
http://pro.oxfordclub.com/DDSKY3959PESDBNETTTSOXFJVIUPS4/PORER800/?h=true

2. The Vulnerability of Our Electric Utility System to Cyber Attacks

The Vulnerability of Our Electric Utility System to Cyber Attacks

3. Vulnerabilities of U.S. Infrastructure: We Need To Pay More Attention

Vulnerabilities of U.S. Infrastructure: We Need To Pay More Attention

The Vulnerability of Our Electric Utility System to Cyber Attacks

I have touched on this issue in an earlier blog post (‘Vulnerabilities of U.S. Infrastructure: We Need To Pay More Attention’) and turn to it again because its importance and associated risks have been highlighted by the recent hacking of SONY’s corporate web site. The U.S. and other countries are highly vulnerable to digital hacking – a point emphasized again by the recent hacking of U.S. Department of Defense web sites – and unless we take steps to adequately protect our web-connected systems from these interventions I fear we will pay a terrible price. Too many of our public systems are now remotely controlled by wireless networks, and someone bent on doing damage and who knows how to hack can make us hostage if our systems are penetrated. My concern is less with SONY than with our centralized electric utility systems that power our homes, businesses, hospitals, water supply systems, and many other aspects of modern life.

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Is it difficult to provide this cyber protection? The simple answer is yes, for several reasons: the growing numbers of wireless networks and cyber hackers, the cost of counteracting malicious hacking, the availability of trained professionals to address the hacking issue, and what I have long considered a major problem: the inability to focus enough attention on cyber security issues.

Let me discuss each of the barriers in order. Wireless networking is growing because it offers many advantages – reduced wiring requirements and related costs, remote operation and reduced manpower requirements, ability to monitor more variables continuously and control systems to a finer degree. Disadvantages arise when inadequate attention is paid to preventing hacker penetration into the network, thus allowing disruption of normal operations or allowing hackers to take control of the network. Also, the number of capable hackers is increasing rapidly. Many schemes have been proposed for restricting unauthorized access to a network, usually using passwords, but often these passwords are not adequate to stop an experienced hacker and most people are resistant to remembering long, complicated passwords. Many companies are also not yet convinced of the need to spend the money on sophisticated protection systems, and some may see the consequences of a hacking as less costly than the required investment. At some level we can all relate to this mindset.

Costs are inherent in any attempt to prevent hacking, ranging from software and hardware costs to labor costs. There is some indication that SONY, an electronics company, spent too little on protection costs by underestimating the potential threat to its cyber systems. It is a mistake it won’t make again, and should serve as a wake up call to other corporate and government bodies.

The trained manpower issue is a critical one. As a vice president of Oracle Corporation noted in Congressional testimony: the vast majority of people available today to address cyber security issues are the ones who designed and implemented the current vulnerable information technology system. Should they be the ones to try and fix it, or do we need newly-trained cyber experts who are not so closely linked to today’s operating modes? Clearly there are people who have the requisite high level skills – think NSA – but are they available broadly on a global basis? Looks like a good field to get into as soon as possible.

Finally, let me address the issue of focusing attention on cyber security issues. I come to this discussion with some personal experience. Several years ago I served on a Department of Defense (DoD) committee reviewing energy proposals for military buildings and bases. Other members of the committee were from the various military services and the DoD Secretary’s office. DoD has always taken an interest in energy issues as a large part of their costs are energy-related – e.g., DoD maintains more than 500 buildings globally and the U.S. Air Force is the largest single user of aviation fuel in the world. Many of the proposals we reviewed were for wireless networks on military bases that needed to go independent of the grid at times of grid failure or other times of emergency. Many of the proposals were technically sound, proposing wireless networks on bases that could switch to power sources on the base that were independent of the grid when needed (solar, wind, geothermal, minihydro, diesel) and making sure priority loads were covered first. These networks also allowed continuous monitoring of energy systems and improved energy efficiency on the bases at all times. When I first raised the issue of network vulnerability to hacking I received a cordial hearing but no follow through. In year two, making a pest of myself again, there seemed to be more of an interest in potential hacking problems, perhaps stimulated by the reports of U.S. drones in Afghanistan transmitting unencrypted video signals to troops on the ground that were available both to the U.S. troops and the enemy troops the drones were tracking. I finally gained some traction in year three when the committee seemed more interested in requiring hacking protection in the proposals. Today the issue is hopefully more appreciated and getting much more attention.

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Let me now tie all these concerns to our electric unity system. Today, and for most of the past century, it has been a highly centralized grid system where large central power plants distributed electricity radially via high voltage transmission lines and lower voltage local distribution lines. It was a ‘dumb’ system with little overall control and when one part of the grid went down lots of people lost their electricity supply until the grid problem could be fixed. Today we are developing a ‘smart’ grid with lots of electronic controls that allow isolation of problem areas to minimize the number of people affected, that facilitates transfer of power from one grid region to another, and that allows utilities access to consumer homes and businesses for better balancing of supply and demand. These ‘smart grid’ features offer many advantages to suppliers and consumers, ranging from improved energy security to reduced costs. The downside is that electronic networks controlling these various features of the smart grid can be penetrated by sophisticated hackers, and my impression is that until fairly recently utility executives were not paying sufficient attention to cyber security issues. I hope this is no longer the case, but we all know of utilities that have underinvested in protecting their systems – e.g., Pepco in the Washington, DC/Maryland area who underinvested for years in trimming back trees that could fall on and disrupt power lines during storms.

The sooner we can begin to address these issues in a serious manner the more secure our energy systems will be. At this point we are highly vulnerable to physical sabotage attacks on our exposed power transmission line infrastructure and hacking attacks on our utility control networks. This is true in the U.S. and elsewhere. Let the SONY situation serve as the needed wake-up call.